Institutional-Grade
Contract Security
10-stage automated + human verification pipeline for Solidity, Rust, and Move contracts. Slither + Foundry fuzzing + Dual-AI adversarial review + senior auditor sign-off.
500+
Contracts Audited
$2B+
TVL Protected
98.7%
Detection Rate
< 10d
Avg Turnaround
10-Stage Audit Pipeline
Every audit runs the full pipeline — no shortcuts. Each stage produces structured output consumed by the next.
Source Ingest
Clone and compile your repository. Auto-detect framework: Hardhat, Foundry, Truffle, Anchor.
Framework Detection
Identify Solidity version, pragma locks, compiler flags, and inheritance graph topology.
Static Analysis — Slither
Run Slither with all detectors enabled. Identifies reentrancy, access control, and 90+ detector classes.
Dependency Scan — OSV.dev
Cross-check all npm/pip/cargo dependencies against OSV.dev CVE database for known vulnerabilities.
Role & Governance Analysis
Map all privileged roles, admin keys, time-locks, multi-sig requirements, and upgrade paths.
Fuzzing — Foundry
Property-based fuzz testing with 100,000+ iterations per function to surface edge cases and invariant violations.
AI Layer A — Primary
DeepSeek synthesizes all tool outputs into a structured vulnerability report with severity rankings.
AI Layer B — Adversarial
Second AI model adversarially challenges Layer A — reduces false positives, surfaces missed attack vectors.
Human Review
Senior auditor validates discrepancies, applies domain judgment, approves or overrides each finding.
Published Report
PDF + public audit page with all findings, severity breakdown, remediation guide, and audit badge.
Finding Severity Levels
All findings are classified using a standardized 5-level severity framework aligned with industry standards.
Immediate loss of funds or complete protocol compromise. Must be fixed before deployment.
Significant risk to user funds or protocol integrity under realistic conditions.
Logic errors or design flaws that may cause unexpected behavior in edge cases.
Code quality issues, gas inefficiencies, or best-practice deviations with minor risk.
Suggestions for code clarity, documentation, or non-critical improvements.
What We Check
Our pipeline systematically checks for all known vulnerability classes in Solidity, Rust, and Move smart contracts.
Reentrancy Attacks
CEI pattern violations, cross-function and cross-contract reentrancy
Integer Overflow / Underflow
Unchecked arithmetic in pre-0.8.x contracts and assembly blocks
Access Control Flaws
Missing onlyOwner, incorrect role assignments, privilege escalation
Flash Loan Attacks
Price oracle manipulation via single-block liquidity attacks
Oracle Manipulation
Spot price dependency, TWAP bypass, Chainlink stale data
Front-Running & MEV
Transaction ordering dependence, sandwich attacks, mempool exposure
Upgradability Risks
Storage collisions, uninitialized proxies, unsafe delegatecall
Centralization Risk
Single admin keys, missing timelocks, rug-pull vectors
Signature Replay
Missing nonce, domain separator, and chainId validation
Price Manipulation
AMM spot price abuse, reserve ratio attacks, donation exploits
Timestamp Dependence
Block.timestamp usage for randomness or time-critical logic
Unchecked Return Values
Ignored low-level call returns, ERC20 non-standard transfer
Supported Blockchains
Full audit support across EVM-compatible chains and non-EVM ecosystems.
Report Preview
Every finding in your report includes location, severity, description, proof of concept, and remediation guidance.
Finding
Unchecked External Call Enables Reentrancy in withdraw()
Location
contracts/Vault.sol:L148 — withdraw(uint256 amount)Description
The withdraw() function transfers ETH to msg.sender before updating the internal balance mapping, violating the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern. An attacker can deploy a malicious contract that re-enters withdraw() in its fallback function, draining the vault before the balance is decremented.
Remediation
Update balances[msg.sender] before the external call, or add a nonReentrant modifier from OpenZeppelin ReentrancyGuard.